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Abstract
Portable ballot counters using camera technology
and manual paper feed are potentially more reliable
and less expensive than scanner-based systems. We
show that the spatial sampling rate, geometric
linearity, point-spread function, and photometric
transfer function of off-the shelf consumer cameras are
acceptable for ballot imaging. However, scanner
illumination is much more uniform than can be
economically accomplished for variable size ballots.
Therefore flat-field compensation must be designed
into the image processing software. We illustrate the
mechanical design of a prototype camera-based ballot
scanner based on our comparative observations.

1. Introduction
Technical requirements for counting votes are
different in the United States than in most other
countries. Elections are organized, conducted and
supervised by political parties rather than government
officials. Citizens vote for many elective positions
(town attorney, judge, tax assessor, town engineer,
school board, sheriff …), that in other nations are held
by appointed civil servants, therefore voters may have
to make dozens of choices in any given election. The
slate of candidates, and therefore the ballot, is different
in every election district, so provisions must be made
for tallying ballots in several thousand different sizes
and formats. Furthermore, the definition of a valid
vote, the rules for casting or cancelling votes, and the
mechanisms used for counting, recounting and auditing
votes, all differ from election district to election district
[1,2,3].
The diversity and length of ballots requires flexible
methods of assessing the vote, and the lack of trusted
supervision has led to demands for reliable and

verifiable mechanisms. According to the Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines of 2005, “the system shall
achieve a target error rate of no more than one in
10,000,000 ballot positions.” Requirements for election
technology are compounded by the constitutional
guarantee of privacy (i.e., anonymous voting), access
for handicapped (blind, paraplegic) voters, and
proscription of giving voters any proof of their vote
that could result in buying verifiable votes.
In the wake of the 2000 and 2004 US federal
elections, there has been a groundswell of support
towards paper-based systems. Many scientists and
civic activists believe that Direct Recording Electronic
(DRE) touch-screen systems are intrinsically
untrustworthy because digital records can be
automatically modified en masse. Undetectable
wholesale modification of hardcopy ballots is
considerably more difficult. Paper based voting leaves
a permanent record, subject to human or automated
audit and recount. Evaluation and improvement of
paper-based election technologies are the overall
objectives of our NSF Cyber Trust research project [4].
Although counting ballots in a central location is
more efficient, new laws (HAVA §301) mandate that
ballots also be checked at the polling precinct. An
immediate tally allows the voter to be notified that the
votes for the chosen candidates will be counted rather
than invalidated because of an improperly marked vote
or an accidental overvote. Thus there is a need for
many low-cost ballot reading devices.
Most commercial systems for reading paper ballots
are based on desktop scanner or fax scanner hardware.
Optical scanners are, however, prone to paper jams,
how they work is not obvious to either lay voters or lay
election monitors, and they are fairly expensive.
Problems with scanner-based op-scan devices reported
in recent elections include inconsistent results
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tentatively linked to dust build up [5], and to jamming
caused by ballots moistened by rain-soaked voters [6].
We therefore examine the pros and cons of
camerabased precinct (portable) and election-district
portable ballot counting devices. Cameras have been
used with increasing success in other document image
analysis tasks [7,8,9]. Widespread familiarity with
digital cameras should inspire even more confidence in
camera-based voting systems.
We compare scanner and camera characteristics in
Section 2, describe the proposed camera-based ballot
counter in Section 3, and discuss its putative
advantages in Section 4.

connecting the corners of the letter-sized test chart in
Figure 2 is only 3 pixels. Geometric linearity is
important for global registration against a blank ballot
to locate targets (ovals or squares) and extract voter
marks [10,11].

2. Camera Performance
As a preliminary step to the design of a prototype
camera-based ballot counter (Section 3), we list briefly
our comparative observations on a flatbed scanner
(Epson Perfection 3170 Photo scanner) and a high-end
consumer camera (Cannon G10 Powershot) at RPI
DocLab. We evaluate their geometric linearity, point
spread function, photometric response, and flatness of
field.
Spatial Sampling Rate. Current scanners digitize an
A4 page at 600 dpi without interpolation. Our 15
Megapixel Canon camera can space pixels at about
half that rate. The only items that need to be recovered
from a preprinted ballot (Figure 1) are the voters’
marks. Our experiments indicate that valid voter marks
(filled-in ovals, connections in a broken line, check
marks or X’s) from the preprinted background can be
readily discriminated from the background at 200 dpi.

Figure 2. Geometric Linearity of the Canon
G10 with an AIIM Scanner Test Chart #2. The
red line segment is superimposed on the
bitmap.
Point Spread Function. The edge spread function
(ESF) of the camera is about twice as wide as that of
the scanner. Figure 2 shows several transitions across a
sharp white-to-black edge. The edge spread functions
are not symmetric. The influence of the edge can be
detected in the camera image as far as 3 pixels away in
contrast to an average of 1.5 pixels in the scanner
image. This may require correction (e.g.,
deconvolution) at the image processing stage.

Figure 1. Top: fragment of a scanned 2005
New York State write-in ballot; Bottom: a
smaller fragment from the ballot image
captured with a 4 Megapixel point-and-shoot
camera.

Figure 3. Edge step response of scanner and
camera at 262 dpi at five different locations of
a sharp white-to-black edge on an AIIM
Scanner Test Chart #2.

Geometric Linearity. Improvements in lens design
have significantly improved linearity. The deviation of
the digitized diagonal line from a line segment

Photometric response. The mapping of reflectance
to gray levels for both devices is shown in Figure 4.
Both were measured in several positions with a Kodak
Q13 grayscale reflectance step chart, with gray values
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averaged over 80x80 pixels for the scanner and 50x50
pixels for the camera. Either the reflectance or the
reflective optical density can be readily mapped to a
linear scale. Reliable estimates of the reflectance of the
preprinted marks, rulings and text can be exploited by
image processing algorithms to resolve marks that
overlap the target. A pencil mark over the target is
usually lighter than the target, while a ball-point pen
tends to be darker. Fortunately voters seldom change
their writing instrument while marking a ballot.
Our recent image processing experiments that show
the effect of the contrast between the marks and ballot
backgrounds were reported in [10,11,12]. The
mathematical foundations and preliminary experiments
for taking into account voter consistency are discussed
in [13,14,15].
Figure 5. Left: Gray level contours for a
uniformly colored document taken with the
Epson Perfection 3170 Photo scanner. The
highlighted levels are <220 (blue), 220-230
(green), and >230 (red); Right: Gray level
contours for the same document taken with
the Canon camera. The highlighted levels are
<190 (blue), 190-200 (green), and >200 (red).

Figure 4. Photometric transfer function
(a) scanner (b) camera measured with a
Kodak step chart.
Flatness of field. The uniformity of the photometric
response of the CCD elements in both scanner and
camera is at least an order of magnitude higher than
that of the illumination. Nevertheless, it has been
shown that with a flatbed scanner, OCR errors are not
uniformly distributed across the page [16], which may
disadvantage some candidates. Roller feed scanners are
subject to uneven paper feed that distorts the image.
There is reason to believe that the proposed system will
be less prone to positional effects.
It took us quite a while to devise acceptable
illumination under the constraints imposed by the
physical design of the ballot counter. The design limits
the distance of the light source from the ballot to about
30 cm, and it must avoid casting a shadow of the
camera support and the camera. We currently
illuminate the ballot indirectly with a fluorescent circle
light and white LEDs, but will experiment with flashes
mounted some distance from the camera. The
reflections from our partial light box with a matte
white surface produce rays at many angles and
therefore avoid highlights (glare).

The relationship between position and gray level for
a uniformly colored document is modeled as a
quadratic equation. The product of the coefficients of
the quadratic terms is a measure of the flatness of field.
It is about two orders of magnitude smaller for the
scanner than for the camera. The non-uniformity of
illumination is therefore compensated by a linear
adjustment. The compensated field of flatness of the
camera is better than that of the uncompensated
scanner, as shown in Figure 5.
Compression. Like most consumer cameras, the
Powershot 10 provides RAW output in a proprietary
format that can be converted to TIF using Canon
software provided with the camera. However, under
computer-controlled exposure, the only readily
accessible output is JPG. For the AIIM test chart, the
JPG files are twice as small as TIF.
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for alternative battery operation. Two 26 ampere-hour
lantern batteries will provide ample 12V power for up
to 1000 ballots (1.2 minutes per voter) on Election
Day.

Figure 6. The iso-intensity contour level of the
image in figure 5 after linear flattening. The
highlighted levels are <194 (blue), 194-197
(green), and >197 (red), which is nearly a
tenfold improvement over Figure 5.
To ascertain how much is lost in compression, we
obtained TIF and JPG versions of the same ballot
image, converted them to gray scale, and compared
them pixel by pixel. To our relief, the average
difference between the two images was less than 0.5%
of the range gray levels in the ballot, and the maximum
deviation was 7 gray levels. We conclude provisionally
that the current version of JPG can be used safely for
high-contrast pictures like ballots.

3. Mechanical and electronic design
In Section 2 we showed current consumer cameras
can produce adequate ballot images. However, the
mechanical design based on camera imaging differs
considerably from that based on a line scanner. Here
we describe the configuration of a prototype device.
The galvanized steel enclosure is 50cm x 46cm x 64
cm with an externally accessible ballot chute, an
adjustable camera mount, and a manually operated
punch that allows invalidating an over-voted,
undervoted, or misinterpreted ballot (Figure 7). The
lights and the camera are triggered by a photo sensor
when the ballot is in place (the light source is not
shown in Figure 7.) An Arduino Duemilanove
microcontroller with six analog inputs and 14 digital
I/O ports, programmed through a USB port in C#,
keeps track of the number of ballots, the number of
cancelled ballots, and the number of camera images.
It is desirable to avoid the tangle of extension cords
usually found at temporary voting locations like
churches and schools. The system is therefore designed

Figure 7. Mechanical design of Portable Ballot
Counter.
The actual operation of the device is envisaged as
follows. The voter will deposit a filled-out ballot in the
chute, which will carry it beyond the voter’s reach. The
ballot image is captured, retained in a secure writeonce memory, and immediately analyzed. The
interpretation is then displayed on a screen at the top of
box for inspection by the voter. The voter either
presses a button to cast the vote, or voids the ballot
with the punch. In the latter case, a light signals the
cancelled ballot to the election judge, who may then
issue a fresh one.
The punch is a temporary expedient: eventually
invalidated ballots must be guided to a separate,
equally secure, container. During the development
phase the images are exported to a laptop for mark
extraction and display of the results.
Although the electronics and software are essential
components, they need not be absolutely foolproof
provided that access to the marked ballots is fully
secured by the mechanical design. Subsequent
verification can be accomplished by (1) inspection of
the ballot images, (2) acquisition and analysis of new
images of the ballots with other ballot scanners, and (3)
visual inspection of the original ballots.

4. Discussion
We presented our ideas and observations toward the
development of a prototype camera-based portable
ballot counter. We believe that such a device offers the
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following advantages over traditional roller-feed
flatbed scanners:
Transparency. The mechanism should be obvious to
an electorate accustomed to cell-phone cameras.
Robust paper transport. Paper jams, such as caused
havoc in some precincts during the 2008 elections
should be rare, and easily cleared.
Energy efficiency: Power consumption is minimal
(no motors), and portability is ensured by the optional
dry cell power supply.
Flexible ballot format and design. Only two sliders
need to be mechanically adjusted to accommodate
ballot formats up to A2 (420 by 594 mm) on a wide
variety of stock (paper weight/thickness).
Speed. Operation of the camera is virtually
instantaneous, so fewer such devices are required for
each polling place. The voter capacity of the device
will depend primarily on the time required to verify the
displayed interpretation, which in turns depends on the
average number of offices voted in the precinct.
Cost. Because of its simplicity and reliance on
inexpensive off-the-shelf components, both purchase
and maintenance costs should be highly competitive
with reported costs ranging from $5500 to $11,000
[2,17,18,19]. We also expect that camera-based
systems will require less training for temporary
election supervisors without a technological
background.
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